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The Importance of Call Delays and Cash
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ERIC L. MAIS***
We examine a sample of in-the-money convertible preferred stock calls
and find that they are delayed. We find that the length of the call delay
does not depend on the relation between the preferred stock dividends and
the pro rata common dividends to be paid on conversion. Thus, our evi-
dence suggests that preferred stock calls may be used for signaling pur-
poses. In support of this, we find that only delayed calls (i.e., those with
potential signaling elements) are viewed negatively by equity^ investors.
We also show that, in responding to delayed call announcements, investors
appear to react to two distinct information elements. First, price responses
to delayed calls are increasingly negative the larger the cash flow dis-
advantage to calling. In other words, common investors respond more
negatively to calls when the forced conversion results in convertible hold-
ers receiving larger dividends than were previously required. Second, both
cash flow advantage and cash flow disadvantage firms experience signif-
icant downward shifts in earnings growth during post-call periods, sug-
gesting that delayed calls are timely signals of decreasing profitability.
1. Introduction
Academic researchers have devoted considerable time to the study of con-
vertible security calls. Given the theoretical proposition that a security should be
called as soon as its conversion value exceeds its call price (Brennan and Schwartz
[1977]; IngersoU [1977a]), and some empirical findings to the contrary, much of
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the literature focuses on whether calls of convertible securities are delayed.' Several
studies (e.g., Ingersoll [1977b], Constantinides and Grundy [1987]) find that con-
vertible securities are deep in-the-money when called, and thus conclude that calls
are delayed. Other studies (e.g., Asquith [1995]; Dunn and Eades [1989]) examine
the appropriateness of call timing based on whether call protection periods have
lapsed, whether positive option premia exist, and/or whether firms have consistent
relative cash flow positions when call decisions are made.
Another segment of the literature examines stock price reactions and firm per-
formance surrounding convertible security calls. The purpose of these studies (e.g.,
Byrd and Moore [1996]; Shastri and Shastri [1996]; Campbell, Ederington, and
Vankudre [1991]) is to determine whether calls convey information to the market.
Although such studies typically conclude that no material earnings-based signals
are sent, at least one critical oversight persists—tests for information effects in-
variably are conducted without properly accounting for whether the underlying calls
are delayed.
Most of these studies focus on in-the-money securities, implicitly assuming
that the associated calls are delayed.^ However, Asquith's (1995) analysis of con-
vertible bonds shows that securities may be in-the-money at the time of the call
without their calls being delayed. In other words, although "in-the-moneyness" is
doubtless a necessary condition for the existence of a call delay, it is not a sufficient
condition. For example, calls may be made immediately after call protection periods
expire or when the security's option premium is negative. Under either of these
scenarios, even if the securities are in-the-money at the time of the call, the calls
are not "delayed." As a result, no information effects should exist. In essence,
treating delayed and nondelayed calls as equal both ignores the theoretical under-
pinnings of optimal call policy and biases against detecting information effects in
empirical tests.
Asquith (1995) illustrates that convertible bond calls are not delayed; therefore,
it is unlikely that convertible bond calls have signaling elements. However, Dunn
and Eades (1989) and Byrd et. al (1997) report confiicting evidence regarding
convertible preferred stock call delays.' Given this discrepancy, the first question
that this paper addresses is whether convertible preferred stock calls are delayed.
1. In order for the call to transfer the option value from convertible preferred stockholders to
comnion stockholders, the preferred security's market price must exceed its conversion value.
2. Out-of-the-money calls (i.e., "early calls") are much less frequent and are not directly com-
parable to in-the-money calls. Acharya and Handa (1991) report that only about 20 percent of con-
vertible bond calls are out-of-the-money.
3. Call delays may exist for convertible preferred stock issues and not for convertible bond issues
due to tax shield and maturity differences. Mikkelson (1985) suggests that firms call convertible debt
due to the anticipated loss of future debt tax shields. This may prompt firms to call convertible bonds
for reasons that would not result in a call of convertible preferred securities. Additionally, the finite
life of convertible bonds gives rise to a shorter window of opportunity, during which a call would allow
for expropriation of wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Either of these factors might account for
the shorter (or zero) cross-sectional call delay for convertible bonds, as identified by Asquith (1995).
CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK CALLS 165
We then investigate whether existing delays are consistent with the cash flow ar-
guments presented by Asquith and Mullins (1991), and whether delayed calls con-
tain elements of information signaling.
Our tests show that convertible preferred stock calls are delayed." The 71 firms
in our sample delay calling by an average of more than three months after allowing
for a 20 percent safety margin and after considering call protection periods. We
also show, in contrast to Asquith (1995), that call delay length cannot be explained
by firms' relative cash flow positions. This finding reintroduces the possibility that
delayed convertible preferred stock calls may convey information. In support of
this proposition, we show that the announcement period price effect is significantly
negative only for the subsample of firms that delay calling, and is most negative
for firms that force conversion when there is a cash flow disadvantage to doing so.
Our final tests illustrate that delayed calls are followed by significant decreases in
earnings growth. In total, our results indicate that by failing to analyze only delayed
calls, previous studies may have missed an important factor in evaluating the in-
formation content of convertible preferred stock calls.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief
review of the empirical literature regarding convertible security calls. Section 3
describes our sample selection procedure and sample summary characteristics, and
Section 4 provides an analysis of call delays. Section 5 presents the results of our
event study, and Section 6 presents the cross-sectional regression analysis. The
approach used to measure earnings growth changes around the call announcements
and the results of the analysis are described in Section 7. Section 8 presents alter-
native specifications and sensitivity tests, and the final section provides a summary
and concluding remarks.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Cash Flow Positions and Stock Price Effects
IngersoU (1977a) shows that convertible securities should be called as soon as
the conversion value exceeds the call price. However, IngersoU (1977b) documents
that the median firm waits until the conversion value exceeds the call price by 44
percent. To explain this apparent anomaly, Constantinides and Grundy (1987) and
Asquith and Mullins (1991) posit that the timing of a call may depend on firms'
cash flow positions and, as a result, may be critical in determining whether the call
has information value. Specifically, they suggest that a finn's call decision may be
a function of the relation between the existing required payments on the convertible
securities and the common dividends that would be paid if the securities were
4. As with most other studies examining cotivertible preferred stock calls, all of our convertible
preferred issues have conversion values that are greater than their call prices. However, the calls we
examine are truly delayed in that (1) the 20 percent safety premium is incorporated, (2) call protection
periods have expired, and (3) 88 percent of the issues have market prices that are greater than their
conversion values (i.e., have positive option premia).
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converted. For example, firms having preferred dividend payments that are higher
than their pro rata common dividend payments (cash flow advantage firms) may
be expected to call as quickly as possible because there is a cash flow advantage
to doing so. On the other hand, firms having common dividend payments that are
higher than the required preferred dividend payments (cash flow disadvantage
firms) may be expected to delay calling to conserve cash.
Jaffe and Shleifer (1990) argue that to ensure that the convertible security is
still in-the-money when the call is completed, firms in a cash flow advantage po-
sition may rationally delay a call until the conversion value exceeds the call price
by a certain safety margin. Brigham's (1966) survey of managers reports that man-
agers consider a 20 percent premium a sufficient safety margin. Asquith and Mul-
lins (1991) propose the same 20 percent safety premium, stating that this figure is
commonly used by both managers and investment bankers. Asquith and Mullins
(1991) also report that the 20 percent premium is almost twice the average monthly
standard deviation of stock returns for their sample, suggesting that it is a reason-
able empirical proxy for the safety margin described by Jaffe and Shleifer (1990).
2.2 Signaling and Stock Price Efi'ects
Although cash flow advantage and disadvantage positions may explain part of
firms' call decisions, signaling elements may exist as well. Harris and Raviv (1985)
present a formal model of convertible bond call policy with asymmetric information
between managers and investors. They show that call delays signal managers' ex-
pectations that common stock prices will rise in the future, causing convertible
security holders to convert voluntarily. In contrast, managers choose to call in-the-
money securities when they expect that future common stock prices will not be
high enough to entice voluntary conversion. Therefore, the decision to call may
signal managers' private expectations regarding (decreasing) future cash fiows.'
Comparable directional predictions are generated by Constantinides and Grundy
(1987), who suggest that a call forcing conversion may convey the expectation that
common dividends will not rise sufficiently in the future to invoke voluntary con-
version. In support of these signaling hypotheses, empirical studies by Mikkelson
(1981) and Mais, Moore, and Rogers (1989) document negative abnormal returns
to common stock in response to announcements of convertible bond and convertible
preferred stock calls, respectively.
Asquith (1995) analyzes deviations from optimal call policy for in-the-money
convertible bonds.* Asquith (1995) measures call delay as the number of days
convertible bonds remain uncalled when they are 120 percent in-the-money and
5. The signaling model of Harris and Rayiv (1985) applies most directly to convertible bonds in
that the model incorporates the finite life of the bonds' conversion option. Because most convertible
preferreds entail perpetual options, this model would have to be expanded to generate identical predic-
tions for preferred calls.
6. Optimal call policy also requires that the price of the convertible security exceed its conversion
value in order for the call to squelch the option value of the security.
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call protection periods have expired.^ He finds that no significant call delay exists
beyond that which can be rationalized by call protection periods and cash flow
disadvantage positions. He therefore concludes that convertible bond calls are not
used to signal managers' views regarding future cash flows.
Byrd et al. (1997) find that calls of convertible preferred stock are delayed
when delay is defined, as in Asquith (1995), as the number of days an in-the-
money convertible preferred issue remains uncalled after the protection period has
passed. They also find that the delay cannot be explained by firms' cash flow
positions. However, for 17 of their 23 called in-the-money issues, they find that
the average option premium is negative, implying that the opportunity for a wealth
transfer from preferred shareholders to common shareholders prior to the call did
not exist. Dunn and Eades (1989), however, find a positive average option premium
for their sample of 57 conversion-forcing preferred stock calls; thus, the evidence
regarding option premia is mixed."
A few recent studies have examined the valuation effects of calls of out-of-
the-money convertible securities. In contrast to the negative signaling implications
associated with in-the-tnoney calls, managers may choose to call out-of-the-money
convertible securities if they believe their firm is undervalued. By eliminating the
conversion opportunity, managers force the convertible security holders to accept
a fixed claim that is equal to the call price, thereby preventing them from sharing
in any residual claim that is gained when the market realizes the firm's true value.
The empirical studies of such "early" calls (e.g.. Tang, Kadapakkam, and Singer
[1994], Hingorani, Makhija, and Shastri [1994]; Cowan, Nayar, and Singh [1993])
find positive abnormal returns to common stock when the calls are announced,
suggesting that such calls signal managers' private expectations of higher future
cash flows. These studies are not directly comparable to ours, given that "early"
calls, by definition, are not delayed and do not serve as negative signals regarding
future profitability.
2.3 Calls of Convertible Securities and Changes in Firm
Performance
Harris and Raviv (1985) show that managers choose to call in-the-money se-
curities when future common stock prices are not expected to be high enough to
entice voluntary conversion. In support of this contention, Ofer and Natarajan
(1987) find that in-the-money convertible bond calls are associated with decreased
post-call earnings. However, Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991), hereafter
CEV, argue that the negative post-call abnormal returns and earnings changes docu-
7. Asquith uses the number of consecutive days the bonds remain uncalled (and other measures)
and draws identical conclusions.
8. Dunn and Eades (1989) find that firms do violate optimal call policy by delaying calls of
convertible preferred stock. However, they conclude that the strategy used by firms resulting from
suboptimal conversion on the part of investors is not inferior to the IngersoU (1977a) and Brennan and
Schwartz (1977) models of optimal call policy.
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mented by Ofer and Natarajan (1987) may be biased due to the parameter esti-
mation periods used in their study.' CEV find insignificant post-call cumulative
abnormal returns when sized-based return portfolios or post-period parameter es-
timations are used. Additionally, they find that earnings changes and abnormal
stock price performance depend on the relationship between the after-tax interest
payments made to convertible bondholders and the common dividend they would
receive if conversion were forced by the call.
Byrd and Moore (1996) examine Value Line earnings forecast revisions made
after firms called convertible securities. Their analysis of 90 firms calling convert-
ible bonds and 36 firms calling convertible preferred stock reveals that analysts'
earnings forecasts are revised upward following call announcements. In addition,
Byrd and Moore (1996) present evidence that the raw price effect for convertible
call announcements may be transitory. Shastri and Shastri (1996) also examine
analysts' earnings forecast revisions following conversion-forcing calls of convert-
ible preferred stock. They find that analysts' forecasts are not revised significantly,
but that the variance of analysts' forecasts decreases after calls are announced.
Shastri and Shastri (1996) also document a significant increase in earnings per share
during the call year. These results, as well as Asquith's (1995) finding of little or
no delay for calls of convertible bonds, run counter to signaling models that treat
calls as being indicative of decreased expected future cash flows.
2.4 Contribution of the Present Research
A large body of theoretical and empirical work addresses calls of convertible
securities. Empirical studies typically attempt to determine whether call delays exist
or investigate various aspects of firm performance surrounding call announcements.
Thus far, however, no study has combined the two lines of inquiry to present a
cohesive picture of the call decision. As a result, many of the relevant questions
have not yet been answered satisfactorily. Because Asquith's (1995) work casts
serious doubt on the value of further considering the question of convertible bond
call timing and information, this study focuses on convertihle preferred stock calls.
In the following sections, we investigate the nature of call delays and provide
evidence that delayed calls contain elements of infonnation signaling.
3. Sample Selection and Summary Statistics
Our initial sample of convertible preferred stock calls was identified by ex-
amining yearly changes in preferred stock and convertible preferred stock, as re-
ported on Compustat between 1962 and 1992. We then searched both the Wall
Street Journal and LEXIS/NEXIS for publicly announced calls of convertible pre-
9. Cowan, Nayar, and Singh (1992) also show that postperiod estimation is most appropriate in
assessing postcall performance.
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TABLE 1
Basic Summary Statistics for Calls of In-the-Money Convertible
Preferred Stock Issues Occurring between 1963 and 1992
Descriptive Measure N Mean Median
Call size (millions)"
Complete sample 68 $40,460 $21,785
Cash flow advantage 55 $44,319 $22,000
Cash flow disadvantage 13 $24,125 $9,400
Conversion value to call price''
Complete sample 71 1.673 1.390
Cash flow advantage 57 1.700 1.392
Cash flow disadvantage 14 1.575 1.279
Percentage of original issue called
Complete sample 39 68.885 82.080
Cash flow advantage 31 76.381 88.210
Cash flow disadvantage 8 39.839 28.690
Cash flow position (millions)"
Complete sample 68 $1,567 $0,379
Cash flow advantage 55 $1,962 $0,713
Cash flow disadvantage 13 $-0,109 $-0,033
Cash flow advantage (disadvantage) refers to a firm paying annual pro rata com-
mon dividends that are lower (higher) than the annual dividends required on the con-
vertible preferred shares.
"Call size is the total number of preferred shares called multiplied by the call price.
The total number of shares called could not be determined for 12 of the sample firms.
'• Conversion value is measured as of the call announcement date.
'Cash flow position is the total annual convertible preferred dividends minus the
total annual pro rata common dividends.
ferred stock.'" For the earnings growth analysis, complete earnings data must be
available from Compustat, annual reports, or Moody's manuals from at least three
years before to three years after the call year (year 0). These screens resulted in a
sample of 71 calls that were used in the earnings analysis. For the event study
analysis, daily common stock returns must be available from either the security
issuance date or the end of the call protection period (when call protection exists)
to 400 days after the call announcement date. Sixty-seven observations survived
the returns screen.
Table 1 presents selected summary statistics for our sample of firms. The
median dollar size of the called issues is $21,785 million for the complete sample.
The median size of the called issues for the cash flow advantage subsample is more
than twice that of the cash flow disadvantage subsample. Constantinides and
10. Duplicate firms and out-of-the-money calls were excluded from the initial sample. The re-
maining call announcements are distributed fairly evenly across the sample years. There appears to be
little clustering of events. None of the calls was made in conjunction with a merger or an acquisition.
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Grundy (1987) suggest that a firm may call an in-the-money convertible issue when
it is in a cash flow disadvantage position to eliminate servicing costs for the rela-
tively few remaining unconverted securities. The smaller aggregate call size for
disadvantage firms, coupled with the fact that the median call represents 28.6 per-
cent of the original issue (compared to 88.2% for advantage firms), may be con-
sistent with disadvantage firms using calls as "cleanup" operations.
The called issues are deep in-the-money, with a median conversion value to
call price ratio of 1.390. The cash flow advantage subsample is deeper in-the-money
than the cash flow disadvantage subsample, with a conversion value to call price
ratio of 1.392 (compared to 1.279). For the cash flow disadvantage group, total
preferred dividends are less than total common dividends by an average of $0,109
million. For the cash flow advantage group, preferred dividends exceed common
dividends by an average of $1,962 million."
4. The Existence and Nature of Call Delays
4.1 Call Delay Measures
Table 2 provides summary information regarding the median, upper quartile,
and lower quartile call delays for our sample of 71 firms. Like Asquith (1995), we
initially measured "call delay" by summing the number of days that the conversion
value exceeded the call price (CV > CP) between either (1) the issue date or (2)
the end of the call protection period and the call announcement date.'^ Conversion
values were calculated for each trading day by multiplying the firm's common
stock price by its conversion ratio. To ensure consistency, the conversion ratios
were adjusted for all stock splits and stock dividends occurring between the issue
date and the call announcement date. For 13 of the 71 firms, the issue was called
immediately after call protection expired or when the call was first in-the-money.
For these 13 firms there is zero call delay. The median call delay for the complete
sample, including firms with zero call delay, is 177 trading days; that is, our sample
firms announced calls of their convertible preferred stock issues in excess of eight
months, on average, after they were first in-the-money (and call protection had
ended)."
Asquith and Mullins (1991) and Brigham (1966) suggest that firms typically
make the decision to call (in the spirit of Jaffe and Shleifer [1990]) after the issue
is 120 percent in-the-money to ensure that the security is still in-the-money when
11. The mean cash flow advantage (disadvantage) of $1,962 million ($-0,109 million) represents
0.41 percent (0.05%) of total market value of equity.
12. Thirty-one of the issues were call protected. For the issues with call protection, the period of
protection generally lasted five years. For six firms, the call delay will be understated because CRSP
retums data are first available beginning in 1962. For example, securities issued prior to 1962 that are
in-the-money as of the first day of available CRSP data likely had been in-the-money much longer than
is revealed in our analysis. The only effect, however, is to bias against finding a call delay.
13. This 177-day period does not include the call period, which is typically an additional 30 days
for our sample.
CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK CALLS
TABLE 2
171
Summary Statistics Regarding the Number of Days Firms Delay Calling
Convertible Preferred Stock Issues
Sample
Upper
Quartile Median
Lower
Quartile
Panel A. Complete sample (N = 71)
Number of days in-the-money
Number of days 120% in-the-money
Number of consecutive days in-the-money
once the issue is 120% in-the-money
313
126
112
177
67
62
70
10
II
Panel B. Firms with cash flow advantage to calling (N = 57)"
Number of days in-the-money 251
Number of days 120% in-the-money 125
Number of consecutive days in-the-money
once the issue is 120% in-the-money 112
168
67
60
56
10
Panel C. Firms with cash flow disadvantage to calling (N = H)
Number of days in-the-money 420
Number of days 120% in-the-money 145
Number of consecutive days in-the-money^
once the issue is 120% in-the-money 102
253
68
84
169
7
0
Note that median and upper and lower quartile values are presented here for the complete sample
and for subsamples partitioned according to cash flow position.
"Cash flow advantage firms are firms with preferred dividends greater than pro rata common
dividends.
''Cash flow disadvantage firms are firms with pro rata common dividends greater than or equal to
preferred dividends.
the call is completed. Therefore, the optimal call date can be viewed as the date
on which the firm's common stock price exceeds the call price by 20 percent.
When we introduce this 20 percent safety margin, we find that a material delay
still exists. The median interval in which the issues are 120 percent in-the-money
is 67 trading days. In other words, even if the optimal call date is redefined to
allow for the 20 percent premium, we find that firms still delay calling their con-
vertible preferred stock in excess of three months, in addition to the typical 30- to
60-day call period.
For some firms, beginning measurement of the delay on the first day the se-
curities are iti-the-money (or 120% in-the-money) may not provide the best indi-
cation of the deviation from optimal call policy. Some issues, for example, may
fall out-of-the-money rather quickly and may not be in-the-money again until a
later date. Therefore, we implement an alternative measure that is based on the
number of consecutive days the security is in-the-money after it initially satisfies
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the 20 percent call safety margin. We find that for over 75 percent of our sample
firms, the securities do not fall out-of-the-money once the 20 percent safety margin
is reached. Across all firms, the median number of consecutive pre-announcement
days the issues are in-the-money, beyond the 20 percent safety margin, is 62 days
(see Table 2). The evidence from panel A indicates, therefore, that call delays
persist across all specifications.
4.2 Call Delays and Cash Flow Positions
Asquith (1995) finds, for a sample of convertible bond calls, that firms that
are in a cash flow advantage position have a much shorter call delay than do firms
that are in a cash fiow disadvantage position. For our sample of convertible pre-
ferred stock calls, however, the average call delay length does not appear to depend
on firms' cash flow positions. Panel B of Table 2 shows that firms in a cash flow
advantage position have a median call delay, after factoring in the 20 percent safety
premium, of 67 days. This interval is virtually identical to that of firms in a cash
flow disadvantage position (68 days). However, the median number of consecutive
days in-the-money once the 20 percent safety margin is reached is somewhat
shorter for cash fiow advantage firms (60 days) than for cash flow disadvantage
firms (84 days).
To provide a more formal test of the relation between call delays and cash
flow positions, we estimate the following model from Asquith (1995). The purpose
of the model is to determine whether the relation between the common dividend
and the preferred dividend adjusted for the conversion ratio explains the length of
call delays experienced by our sample firms.
DELAY .^ = a -I- p DIVRAT,. + z.. (1)
In eq. (1), all variables are as defined by Asquith (1995). Specifically, DELAY is
the log of the number of days the security was 120 percent in-the-money and
DIVRAT is the log of the ratio of the largest annualized common dividend paid
from the time the security was first 120 percent in-the-money until it was called
to the annual dividend paid to the preferred holders (adjusted for the conversion
ratio).'"' Asquith (1995) finds p to be positive and significant for his sample of
convertible bond calls and concludes that call delays are an increasing function of
the cash fiow disadvantage to calling. By extension and with additional analysis,
Asquith concludes that convertible bond calls are not delayed irrationally. Our
finding for convertible preferred stock calls, however, is that P, while positive, is
14. One issue was called prior to being 120 percent in-the-money. In the regression analysis the
call delay used for this firm is the number of days the issue was in-the-money. The information in
Table 2 reflects zero days at 120 percent in-the-money for this sample point.
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not significant." We conclude that the relative size of the preferred and common
dividends may influence the decision to call convertible preferred stock, but that it
does not explain the length of the call delay that we detect. In other words, As-
quith's findings for convertible bond calls do not appear to hold for calls of con-
vertible preferred stock.
4.3 Sensitivity Tests—Option Premia
To complete the call delay analysis, we investigated the option premia asso-
ciated with the called issues. Specifically, we calculated the option premium, de-
fined as the preferred stock's market price minus its conversion value, for each
firm for every trading day in which conversion could have been forced (i.e., when
the security was in-the-money and the protection period had passed).'* In this
framework, the existence of a positive average premium across the period would
suggest that the call, which would expropriate the option premium to the benefit
of common shareholders, was delayed. Unlike Byrd et. al (1997) who find that
only 26 percent (6 of 23) of the conversion-forcing calls in their sample have a
positive average option premium, we find that 88 percent of our calls have a pos-
itive premium.'^ Under an alternative specification that defines the premium as the
ratio of the preferred price to the conversion value, our mean option premium is
1.021. This value is very similar to the 1.029 mean option premium noted by Dunn
and Eades (1989)."*
Based on these findings and on the results presented in previous sections, our
conclusion is that convertible preferred stock calls are delayed. Our results hold
after considering call protection periods and are robust to numerous alternative
specifications. Furthermore, unlike' convertible bond calls, the delay associated with
calls of convertible preferred stock cannot be explained by firms' cash flow
positions.
15. Variables including the dollar value of the called issue, a dummy variable representing
whether the call was underwritten, and the average option premium over the delay period were also
included in eq. (I). None of the coefficient estimates were statistically significant. The results are
qualitatively unchanged when DELAY is defined as the number of consecutive days the securities are
in-the-money prior to the call announcement beginning with the first day the securities are 120 percent
in-the-money. The results are even less significant {p = 0.84) when the raw rather than the logged
values are used in the model. We emphasize the results for the model using the logged specification
so that they are directly comparable to Asquith (1995).
16. For our sample of 58 firms with calls that were not called immediately once they were in-
the-money or after call protection expired, 42 had complete preferred stock price data available for
calculating the average option premium.
17. It is possible, but doubtful, that the difference in our findings and those of Byrd et al. (1997)
is due to the fact that only 14 of their 23 calls were publicly announced. Of the 14 publicly announced
calls studied by Byrd et al. (1997) we do not know how many have positive option premium values,
nor do we know (he average option premium they find for all 23 conversion-forcing calls.
18. If the firm conforms to optimal call policy, transaction costs are zero, and there is no call
period, the expected value under the null hypothesis of the difference between the convertible preferred
price and the conversion value is zero. Under the same conditions the expected value of the ratio of
the convertible preferred price to the conversion value is one.
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TABLE 3
Event Study Results for Firms Announcing Calls of Convertible Preferred
Stock
Panel A. Firms
Interval
(-100,-2)
(-1,0)
(+l,+ 100)
Panel B. Firms
Interval
(-100,-2)
(-1,0)
(-1-1,-1-100)
that delay calling (/V
Preperiod
Mean CAR
7.95**
-1.97**
-10.87**
= 56)
Estimation (%)
Median CAR
7.34**
-1.57**
-10.89
that do not delay calling (W = 11)
Preperiod
Mean CAR
7.24
-0.63
0.99
Estimation (%)
Median CAR
0.68
-1.05
-2.81
Postperiod
Mean CAR
17.97**
-1.70**
-0.44
Estimation (%)
Median CAR
14.75**
-1.48**
-3.43
Postperiod Estimation (%)
Mean CAR
7.95
-0.70
1.90
Median CAR
11.42
-0.75
1.50
** Denotes significance at /? £ 0.05
5. Abnormal Returns to Common Stock
We use an event study method to measure the common stock price response
to announcements of delayed calls of convertible preferred stock. Abnormal returns
are calculated for the period beginning 200 days before to 200 days after the call
announcement date using a value-weighted market model.'* For the pre-event es-
timation procedure, the estimated coefficients are calculated using the 200 trading
days that end 201 days prior to the announcement date. For the post-event esti-
mation procedure, the coefficients are estimated using the 200 trading days begin-
ning 201 days after the announcement date. Tests of statistical significance are
based on Z statistics calculated using the method of Mikkelson and Partch (1988).
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests are used to evaluate the significance of median abnormal
returns.
Table 3 presents the event study results for the nondelayed calls and for the
delayed calls. We find that only delayed calls are associated with significantly
decreased common shareholder wealth at announcement. Specifically, using the
post-event estimation procedure, we detect a mean abnormal share price response
19. Our results do not differ qualitatively when an equally weighted market model is estimated,
nor when we estimate betas in the manner of Scholes and Williams (1977). The market index that is
used in our market model estimations is a combined NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ index. Seven of the
sample firms are traded on AMEX and two are traded on NASDAQ. Share price responses do not
differ significantly across exchanges.
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of -1.70 percent (p < 0.01) for firms that delayed calling. The median abnormal
share price response of -1.48 percent is also significant at the 0.01 level. These
results contrast our finding of an insignificant two-day abnormal return for the zero-
delay firms. We also find that the announcement period abnormal returns for the
delayed call sample are significantly different from (i.e., are more negative than)
those of the nondelayed sample (p < 0.04). In other words, only delayed calls—
that is, those that may be expected to have information content—result in signifi-
cant share price depreciation.^"
The results presented in Table 3 suggest that announcement period stock price
performance is independent of the parameter estimation period that is employed.
However, consistent with CEV, we find that the post-call abnormal returns calcu-
lated from post-event estimation parameters are not significantly different from
zero.^' Therefore, our results based on the post-event parameter estimation for the
delayed call sample of firms suggest that negative information may be revealed at
the announcement of these calls, and that the announcement period effect may not
be transitory. This conclusion is consistent with the finding of Mazzeo and Moore
(1992) that announcement period abnormal returns for calls of convertible preferred
stock are not correlated with cumulative abnormal returns over the conversion
period.
6. Cross-Sectional Analysis
In this section, we present an analysis of the cross-sectional determinants of
price responses to delayed call announcements. Our analysis is similar to that of
Kadapakkam and Tang (1996), Hingorani et al. (1994), and Cowan, Nayar, and
Singh (1992). An important difference, however, is that our tests include only
delayed calls. From a theoretical perspective, and as was documented empirically
in the previous section, these are the only types of calls that should have infor-
mation content.
Table 4 presents the results of our cross-sectional analysis. In all models the
dependent variable is the two-day abnormal return. Independent variables include
UNDER, which is equal to one if the call was underwritten and zero otherwise;
RELSIZE, which represents the size of the call relative to the firm's market value
of common equity; DIVRAT (defined as in eq. [1]), which measures the magnitude
of the cash flow advantage or disadvantage to calling; and EXTENT, which meas-
ures the degree to which the convertible preferred issue was in-the-money when it
was called.
The first variable to be included (model 1) is UNDER. Cowan, Nayar, and
20. When the delay subsample is defined as firms also having positive option premia, the sample
size is reduced to 37. The two-day abnormal return for this subsample is -1.92% (Z = -3.69).
21. Our finding of significantly positive pre-period abnormal returns and insignificant post-period
abnormal returns is comparable to the results presented in CEV's study of convertible bond calls. Given
the potential bias resulting from the use of pre-event parameter estimation techniques (see CEV for a
description of this problem) the post-event results are deemed more reliable.
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TABLE 4
Results of Selected Cross-Sectional Regressions for the Sample of Firms with
Delayed Calls of Convertible Preferred Stock (Test Statistics Are in
Parentheses)
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
CONSTANT
-0.90**
(-2.38)
-0.87*
(-1.71)
-1.12**
(-2.20)
-1.08*
(-1.90)
UNDER
-1.78**
(-2.48)
-1.76**
(-2.35)
-2.02**
(-2.74)
-2.04**
(-2.72)
RELSIZE
_
-0.44
(-0.08)
-1.59
(-0.32)
-1.75
(-0.35)
DIVRAT
_
—
-2.84**
(-2.04)
-2.85**
(-2.02)
EXTENT
_
—
—
-0.03
(-0.17)
Adjusted R-
0.095
0.076
0.135
0.115
* Denotes significance at /? s 0.10.
** Denotes significance at p £ 0.05.
UNDER = 1 if the call was undewritten, 0 otherwise.
RESIZE = aggregate call price/market value of common equity.
DIVRAT = log of (common dividend/preferred dividend adjusted for conversion ratio), as per
Asquith (1995).
EXTENT = (conversion value - call price)/call price
Singh (1992) suggest that managers are likely to enlist the services of an under-
writer if they fear that the convertible issue will fall out-of-the-money during the
conversion period. Of the 56 delayed-call firms included in the event study analysis,
we identified 18 having underwritten calls and 38 having nonunderwritten calls."
As is shown in Table 4, the coefficient estimate for UNDER in model 1 is negative
and statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the results of Cowan,
Nayar, and Singh (1992), and indicates that managers' uncertainty regarding stock
prices over the conversion period is viewed negatively by investors."
According to Kadapakkam and Tang (1996), larger calls may provide more
negative information and may be associated with greater price pressure than calls
of smaller issues. We add RELSIZE to our basic model to control for these effects.
Similar to Kadapakkam and Tang (1996), model 2 in Table 4 reveals a negative
relation between TWODAY and RELSIZE; however, in our model the size effect
is not significant. Adding RELSIZE to the model also decreases the model's ex-
planatory power, in that the adjusted /?2 for model 2 is 0.076, compared to 0.095
for model I. Both of these values are comparable to those presented by Kadapak-
kam and Tang (1996).
To measure the effects of cash flow positions on abnormal returns, model 3
22. Underwriting data were collected from either the Investment Dealer's Digest Directory of
Corporate Financing or the Wall Street Journal.
23. Kadapakkam and Tang (1996) and Hingorani et al. (1994) do not find the underwriting effect
to be significant.
CONVERTIBLE PREFERRED STOCK CALLS 177
includes DIVRAT. DIVRAT, as defined in Section 4, measures the magnitude of
the cash flow disadvantage position. A ratio in excess of one identifies cash flow
disadvantage firms, while a ratio less than one identifies cash fiow advantage firms.
The coefficient estimate for DIVRAT in model 3 is negative and significant, in-
dicating that the larger the cash fiow disadvantage to calling, the more negatively
investors react to delayed call announcements. This result reveals that common
shareholders view as negative firms' decisions to wake their "sleeping" preferred
investors and, forthwith, pay dividends to them that are higher than were previously
required (IngersoU [1977a], Dunn and Eades [1989]).^" The inclusion of DIVRAT
also increases the explanatory power of the model, relative to that of models 1 and
2.
The final specification presented in Table 4 adds EXTENT, which measures
the extent to which the convertible preferred issue was in-the-money when it was
called. Kadapakkam and Tang (1996) propose that the coefficient for EXTENT
should be negative because firms that force conversion of deep-in-the-money se-
curities "should fear severe trouble ahead." In contrast. Cowan, Nayar, and Singh
(1992) propose a positive relationship because holders should have already con-
verted on their own; therefore, the reason for the call is less likely to be negative
information received by management. Similar to Kadapakkam and Tang (1996)
and Hingorani et al. (1994), we find no relationship between abnormal returns and
EXTENT. Therefore, in-the-moneyness does not appear to be an important deter-
minant of price responses to convertible preferred stock call announcements.
In total, our cross-sectional analysis reveals that calls that are underwritten and
that increase the relative dividend payment to convertible preferred holders are
viewed more negatively by common stockholders. Additional specifications are
reserved for Section 8.
7. Changes in Earnings Growth
In this section, we investigate whether delayed calls of convertible preferred
stock signal impending changes in the cash flow of calling firms. Similar to CEV,
we utilize earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as a proxy for cash fiows."
We measured changes in earnings growth for our sample of firms relative to a
matched sample of control firms from five years before to five years after the call
announcements. Each firm in the call sample having a nonzero delay was assigned
one match (control) firm based on the calling firm's three-digit SIC code and market
value of equity at the end of the call announcement year.^ * The "best" match was
determined by comparing the ratio of the calling finn's market value of equity to
24. Both cash flow advantage and cash flow disadvantage firms have significantly negative ab-
normal returns. Therefore, some of the negative information signals associated with calls from a cash
flow advantage position appear to exist for disadvantage firms as well.
25. Our results are similar when we define "earnings" as earnings per share.
26. There are nine firms for which two digit SIC codes were used. Sitnilar results obtain when
we match sample firms against industry averages rather than individual size-matched observations.
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the prospective matching finn's market value of equity. A ratio between 0.90 and
1.10 was deemed an acceptable match." Changes in EBIT growth were measured
on an annual basis from years —5 to -1-5 relative to the call announcement year
(year 0) using the method employed by CEV. Specifically, we estimate the follow-
ing models (models 1 and 3 used by CEV):
Model 1: F,, = cp, -I- X,.D,, + e,,, (2)
Model 2: (P , - P^,) = cp, + ip, + E,, (3)
Earnings growth is calculated by subtracting the previous year's earnings from the
current year's earnings and dividing by the previous year's earnings. Here P,, is
the earnings growth rate for calling firm i in year t, D,., is equal to zero for years
prior to the call and one after the call, and P^, is the earnings growth rate for the
match firm. Model 1 facilitates tests of pre-call earnings growth rates (ip) and shifts
in earnings growth rates (k). Model 2 provides a similar framework, with the
coefficients representing deviations from industry norms. In both models, post-call
earnings growth is measured, alternatively, from year 0 to year -1-3, from year 0
to year -1-4, and from year 0 to year + 5 . Given the relatively small sizes of the
subsamples, median values are presented in all cases.^"
Panel A of Table 5 presents the earnings growth analysis as defined by model
1. We present results for the complete sample of firms, for the cash fiow advantage
partitions, and for the underwriting partitions. Across all three partitions, firms that
called convertible prefened stock experienced significantly positive earnings
growth during the five-year pre-call period. The median EBIT growth rate across
all firms is 29.16 percent, with the largest growth experienced by cash fiow ad-
vantage firms (33.24%) and nonunderwritten firms (34.05%). To explain the sim-
ilarity between these two earnings growth rates, we conjecture that the underwriting
decision is in part a function of the firm's performance prior to the call. As men-
tioned previously, managers typically choose to have their calls underwritten when
they believe the securities may fall out-of-the-money during the conversion period.
Assuming abnormally high pre-call earnings growth results in higher share prices
(and, as a result, a lower likelihood that the securities will fall out-of-the-money
within the 30- to 60-day conversion period), managers of firms that have recently
experienced abnormally high earnings growth may be less likely to need to have
their calls underwritten. In support of this contention, we find that 78 percent of
the nonunderwritten calls are made by cash fiow advantage firms. In other words,
it seems likely that the tremendous pre-call earnings growth experienced by cash
fiow advantage firms translates into increasing share prices, which results in a
decreased need for underwriting for these firms.
27. If more than one firm appeared to be equally well matched to the calling firm, the firm with
the most years of available data and the most years of market value ratios between 0.90 and 1.10 was
used.
28. The results using mean values and/or including only firms with positive option premia are
comparable.
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Panel A also illustrates that delayed calls of convertible preferred stock signal
significant decreases in earnings growth. Across all firms, three-year post-call earn-
ings growth (column 2) decreases by 11.38 points, representing a drop of almost
40 percent relative to the 29.16 percent pre-call growth rate. The four year post-
call earnings growth (column 3) decrease of -13.12 points is also statistically
significant. The downward shift in earnings growth is significant and negative for
all subsets except firms that have their calls underwritten. The existence of signif-
icant decreases in earnings growth for disadvantage firms as well as advantage
firms supports our conjecture that investors may react negatively to calls made by
disadvantage firms both because of potential signaling elements and because such
calls increase, unnecessarily, the dividends paid to convertible holders. In other
words, the negative earnings signal adds to the cash flow disadvantage effect, which
would also be consistent with the significantly negative estimate for DIVRAT in
Table 4.
When we measure earnings growth across five post-call years (column 4), the
downward shift across all firms is still significant, but is less so than the shifts
associated with three- and four-year earnings growth. Additionally, the five-year
change in earnings growth for cash flow advantage firms, while negative, is not
statistically significant. The decreased significance of the five-year change in earn-
ings growth compared to the highly significant three- and four-year changes in
earnings growth suggests that earnings-related signals are sent by delayed calls, but
that the signals may be more informative about intermediate-term (i.e., three- to
four-year) earnings trends.
In panel B of Table 5 we investigate earnings growth and changes in earnings
growth relative to the matched sample of firms. Across all firms, pre-call earnings
growth exceeds pre-call match firm earnings growth by 12.74 percent. In the post-
call three-year period, however, the change in earnings growth relative to match
firm earnings growth is —12.28 percent. Both estimates are statistically significant,
indicating that firms that call convertible preferred stock experience abnormally
positive (relative to comparable firms) earnings growth prior to the call and ab-
normally negative (relative to comparable firms) changes in earnings growth after
the call. The inferences we draw from model 2 are not as strong as those from
model 1; however, the matched sample results do generally support the firm-
specific results that are reported in panel A. That is, delayed calls of convertible
preferred stock do appear to signal significant changes in earnings growth.
8. Additional Cross-Sectional Specifications and
Sensitivity Tests
8.1 Earnings Growth
If calls unambiguously signal expectations regarding future profitability, we
would expect to observe a positive relationship between the shift in earnings growth
from pre-call to post-call periods and price responses to call announcements. To
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test this proposition we added, individually, the earnings growth shift parameters
(k) from eqs. (2) and (3) to the cross-sectional regression models presented in Table
4. The coefficient estimates for the earnings growth parameters were positive but
not significant at conventional levels; the remaining coefficient estimates were com-
parable to those presented in Table 4. Our conclusion is that the extent of the
realized shift in earnings growth may not be perfectly incorporated into stock prices
at the time of the call announcements.
8.2 Price Pressure Effects
Kadapakkam and Tang (1996) suggest that larger issues may be associated
with relatively strong Hquidity effects; as a result, RELSIZE should be positively
related to post-announcement returns. They also propose that if the initial price
effect is transitory, the announcement period returns should be negatively related
to the post-announcement returns. To investigate these possibilities for our sample
of firms, we regressed the cumulative abnormal return calculated from day +1 to
day +50 relative to the call announcement on the two-day abnormal return and
RELSIZE.^^ In contrast to Kadappakam and Tang (1996), none of the coefficient
estimates were significant at conventional levels. Our results, therefore, are more
consistent with those of Mazzeo and Moore (1992), who find that common stock
prices do not fully recover following calls of convertible preferred stock.
8.3 Additional Signaling Effects
Signaling models (e.g., Constantinides and Grundy [1987]) suggest that in-the-
money cash flow advantage firms will delay calls in anticipation of voluntary con-
version if managers have favorable inside information. These models show that
longer delays should be associated with increasingly positive signals, which should
correspond to increasingly positive pre-call stock price drifts. Similarly, longer
delays should be associated with increasingly negative stock price responses when
the calls eventually are announced (i.e., when the delay stops). Both of these pre-
dictions are supported by our data. We find a significant positive correlation be-
tween call delay length and the cumulative return measured between the date that
the security was first in-the-money and the date the call was announced. We also
find a significant negative correlation between call delay length and the two-day
announcement period return, both in a univariate setting and when call delay length
is included as an additional explanatory variable in Table 4. These results offer
additional support for our contention that delayed calls reveal negative information
concerning managers' expectations of future cash flows.
29. We define the post-announcement interval in a number of ways, including day +1 to day
+25. day +1 to day +75, and day +1 to day +100. Our results are not sensitive to these altemative
specifications.
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9. Summary and Concluding Remarks
Numerous studies have examined the information content of in-the-money con-
vertible preferred stock calls. The most important contribution of this paper is that
information regarding call delays and cash flow positions is actively incorporated
into the research design. In our first set of tests, we examine 71 in-the-money
convertible preferred stock calls and find that 58 of the calls are delayed. These
results are robust to numerous specifications of "delay" and cannot be explained
by the cash flow position model of Asquith (1995). We then partition the sample
into firms that delay calling and those that do not delay calling. For firms having
delays, we find that the abnormal returns experienced on announcement are sig-
nificantly negative; firms that call without delaying, however, do not experience
significant price depreciation at announcement. In total, these results suggest that
only delayed calls are likely to convey information to investors, a result that is
both intuitively appealing and consistent with theoretical work regarding optimal
call policy.
Based on these findings, we then investigate the potential determinants of share
price reactions for firms with nonzero call delays. Our analysis reveals that price
reactions to delayed call announcements are related both to the magnitude of firms'
cash flow positions and to underwriting considerations. Specifically, share price
reactions are increasingly negative the larger the cash flow (i.e., dividend) disad-
vantage to calling. Prices also respond more negatively when the calls are under-
written, due to the fact that the use of an underwriter signals managers' uncertainty
regarding stock prices during the conversion period.
We also find that delayed calls of convertible preferred stock are associated
with significant decreases in earnings growth. Our results hold for both cash flow
advantage firms and cash flow disadvantage firms. Our findings for disadvantage
firms suggest that the increasingly negative share price response for these firms is
due both to the inherent cash flow disadvantage associated with the forced con-
version as well as to the presence of a significantly negative earnings signal. We
leave further refinements and additional investigation to future researchers. At a
minimum, subsequent research should adequately control for call delays and cash
flow positions in investigating the information content of convertible preferred
stock calls.
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